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Introduction
The Ethical Frontiers of Gene Editing
ARTHUR CAPLAN and VOJIN RAKIĆ
In the past few years, some scientists and philosophers—Stephen Pinker, Henry 
Miller, and Tom Koch, to mention a few—have been very critical of the role bioethics 
is playing with respect to medicine and, in particular, genetic engineering. They 
worry that bioethical concerns will hinder the development of an area of science 
that holds great promise for diagnosing, treating, and preventing disease in ani-
mals and human beings. They fear that steps that humanity might take to enhance 
or improve key traits such as intelligence or empathy in animals and humans will 
founder on the rocks of ethical hand-wringing by those who invoke mysterious 
concerns such as human dignity, fear any change involving human nature, and, in 
any event, do not speak for the public.
The doubters of bioethics should not be so worried. Bioethics has done far more 
good than harm in advancing medical research by creating a framework for 
responsible research with animals and laying out principles for advancing recom-
binant DNA research. Perhaps the same cannot be said for lawyers, regulators, 
politicians, or conservative theologians. But they do not represent all or even a 
large part of bioethics.
As this special issue shows, bioethicists can oppose certain interventions in 
altering genomes, or they may well defend and encourage such interventions. 
Bioethics with respect to genetic alteration of microbes, plants, animals, and our-
selves is not just a matter of saying “no” based on abstract fears of possible bad 
outcomes. Bioethics may try to push science and medicine to go faster or lay out 
guidelines for seeking public permission to engage in somewhat risky activity, 
such as the gene drive–mediated elimination of insect pests or mitochondrial 
transplants to repair damaged embryos, or it may try to battle those who say that 
genetically modified foods ought to be banned or avoided. The ones who know 
this best are those who made each of these arguments themselves, which shows 
nothing about their validity but knocks down the canard that bioethics is always 
a deadweight on scientific or genetic progress.
Beyond substantive argument, bioethics has useful insights into what is fair and 
just in resolving disagreements about genetic engineering. If you and your neigh-
bor disagree over whether to release genetically modified mosquitoes in your 
community as part of a research experiment to battle Zika or malaria, should the 
experiment go on? Should branding and fail-safe mechanisms such as terminator 
genes be in place before a genetically modified animal or insect is released into the 
wild? A prudent path forward for ethics research on gene drives and genetic solu-
tions to environmental challenges will create forums for inclusive public discus-
sions and integrate divergent perspectives into ethics literature and policy.
Consider the rapid development of gene therapies, often combined with stem 
cell modifications, to combat cancer. When are gene therapies ready for first-
in-human use? The deaths of patients in clinical trials of CAR-T (chimeric antigen 
receptor T-cell) therapy bring this ethical question into sharp focus. It is not settled 
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cling to the hope that a novel experimental drug will save them. They value fight-
ing to stay alive more than safety.
On the other hand, regulators often prefer a cautious approach to first-in-human 
trials. Whether a drug is ready for first-in-human use depends on whether you ask 
a dying patient, a treating clinician, a drug company’s CEO, or a regulatory official. 
Ethics debate of the sort represented in this special issue clarifies the values in play 
and develops arguments favoring one approach over the other—workable solutions 
subject to criticism and revision.
Bioethicists are not the genetics “police.” The field does not exist simply to block 
innovation or to create boxes that need to be checked by hordes of bureaucrats. 
Bioethics properly pushes and challenges scientists to acknowledge that they 
operate within a society that pays for their work and bears the price of success 
and failure. Bioethicists give voice to divergent moral perspectives and provide a 
framework to facilitate informed and inclusive discussions that can spur and sup-
port progress. In an era when so many pressing challenges will depend on the 
innovations of genetic science—battling emerging infectious diseases, achieving 
food security, increasing food safety, eliminating horrific hereditary diseases—the 
need for bioethics has never been greater. This becomes apparent in various 
contributions to this Special Section.
This is certainly not the first time that CQ has offered its readership the oppor-
tunity to explore arguments about what is morally justified in the field of the most 
promising contemporary biotechnologies: two previous CQ Special Sections were 
devoted to the issue of (moral) enhancement. This time, the authors in the Special 
Section offer seven articles and four commentaries debating biomedical and ethical 
perspectives on genome editing and raising issues that are among the most press-
ing ones in contemporary bioethics.
In the article, “Why We Should Defend Gene Editing as Eugenics,” Nicholas 
Agar subsumes certain types of gene editing as “eugenics.” In his view, this does 
not necessarily disqualify them as immoral. Agar distinguishes between “morally 
wrong” practices, which should be condemned, and practices that are “morally 
problematic.” A “morally problematic” practice ought to be understood quite 
literally as a practice that we distinguish as containing a moral problem, a moral 
dilemma. The existence of the problem necessitates the search for a solution. Agar 
contends that eugenic uses of gene editing fall into this latter category. The same 
applies to preimplantation genetic diagnosis.
In their paper “From Liberal Eugenics to Political Biology,” Nathan Emmerich 
and Bert Gordijn argue that specific biomedical technologies and interventions 
ought to be assessed on their own merits, without being subsumed under 
“eugenics.” However, this does not imply that a supra-ethical or political analysis 
is superfluous. Much to the contrary, all emerging biotechnologies, including pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis and gene editing, ought to be assessed not only on 
the basis of their ethical merits, but also on the basis of their broader social and 
political impact, including their role in public health.
Carolyn P. Neuhaus and Brendan Parent discuss the issue of gene doping in 
animals. It may only take one generation for gene editing techniques to facilitate 
enhancing animals’ capacities beyond their typical limits. Although gene editing 
could be used to improve sport animals’ well-being, Neuhaus and Parent believe 
that this is an unlikely scenario. Animals are already treated as mere objects—
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animals’ welfare and well-being. Currently, they are instrumentally valued for the 
profits they produce, and Neuhaus and Parent do not foresee this attitude changing in 
the case of gene editing in animals.
In his commentary on the Neuhaus-Parent article, Nicolas Delon takes the argu-
ment one step further. He argues that gene editing aimed at enhancement in ani-
mals might be morally permissible, provided it were possible to devise mechanisms 
to acquire their assent. In that case, enhancement would set the bar much higher 
for ethical sports by giving animals a role in determining their own participation 
in sports.
In his article “Genome Editing for Involuntary Moral Enhancement,” Vojin 
Rakić discusses an alternative to compulsory moral bioenhancement and volun-
tary moral bioenhancement: involuntary moral bioenhancement. If possible, 
involuntary moral bioenhancement might engineer offspring who will be more 
moral than they otherwise would have been. Moreover, Rakić argues that a com-
plete program of moral bioenhancement could consist of a combination of volun-
tary moral bioenhancement and involuntary moral bioenhancement of the unborn. 
Voluntary moral bioenhancement would be directed toward individuals who 
have the capacity to comprehend morality, enhancing their motivation to act mor-
ally. Involuntary moral bioenhancement would target the unborn, possibly by 
genome editing for moral enhancement in the domains of empathy, reduction in 
violent aggression, and moral reflection. It might target the unborn individual 
only or the germ line also.
Nick Agar comments on Rakić’s article. He notes that philosophers have the 
tendency to discuss moral enhancement as a thought experiment. However, 
Rakic’s focus on the possibilities of gene editing locates his contribution in the 
“implementation ethics” of moral enhancement. As recent advances in gene edit-
ing add little to moral enhancement as thought experiment, argues Agar, Rakić’s 
implementation ethics is a valuable contribution to the debate on moral enhance-
ment. Nonetheless, Agar points out, as with any novel implementation proposal, 
we cannot be confident of its accuracy before we have considered it in the light of 
moral motivations and how they might impact gene editing for the purposes of 
moral enhancement.
Kevin Fitzgerald and Maria Šulekova Kolesarova argue that there is a need to 
transcend the binocular views on technological development advocated either by 
the “technological conservatives” or the “technological enthusiasts,” and they 
offer the thought of Teilhard de Chardin as a useful guide in reframing the discus-
sion. Central to his work is the maintenance of biosphere and noosphere stability. 
This stability, however, cannot be understood as static. It is rather a continuous 
“moving forward” within the process of biosphere and noosphere preservation. In 
the case of gene editing, the same principles ought to apply: both the enthusiastic 
and conservative approaches are required, although they should be considered as 
parts of an inclusive framework. Fitzgerald and Šulekova propose that Teilhard de 
Chardin’s perspective represents a promising basis for finding such an inclusive 
framework.
The article “Regulating Genome Editing: For an Enlightened Democratic 
Governance,” authored by Giulia Cavaliere, Katrien Devolder, and Alberto 
Giubilini, discusses two competing views on the regulation of genome editing and 
proposes a third alternative approach. The first view, which they refer to as the 
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people would have if they were committed to implementing public policies regu-
lating genome editing in a context of ethical pluralism. The second view, which 
the authors describe as the “democratic” view, emphasizes the importance of 
including the public’s expressed attitudes in the regulation of genome editing. The 
authors propose a third alternative approach—the “enlightened democracy” 
approach—that aims to reconcile the need for democratic engagement involving 
mutual respect for competing views on the one hand and a well-informed discus-
sion on the other.
In his comments on Cavaliere, Devolder, and Giubilini, Oliver Feeney further 
develops and translates into practice their “enlightened democracy approach”—
something that the authors announced as a future endeavor. Feeney notes that 
there are a number of forms of “enlightened democracy” already operational in 
the context of science, medicine, and genetics. Their goal is to increase participa-
tion of various stakeholders in genome editing. Hence, Cavaliere, Devolder, and 
Giubilini already have a foundation on which to build.
Joanna Smolenski raises her concerns regarding the use of CRISPR to alter germ 
lines because of the possibility of unknowable, serious health conditions continu-
ing or worsening through future generations. Furthermore, altering germ lines 
opens up various consent considerations that we are not now capable of success-
fully addressing. Difficulties in providing adequate information about the risks 
and benefits of this technology give us reason, Smolenski argues, to prohibit 
research in this domain—at least at this stage.
In his “Let Us Assume that Gene Editing is Safe—The Role of Safety Arguments 
in the Gene Editing Debate,” Soren Holm analyzes the assertion, frequently made 
in papers and policy reports, that gene editing should be used in humans only 
when it is safe. Holm argues that such an assertion is inconsistent with the philo-
sophical commitments of a number of scholars who use this claim in relation to 
reproductive uses of gene editing. Holm continues by addressing the contexts 
in which the safety argument is made. He distinguishes five such contexts and 
concludes that the “only if it is safe” argument is “part of a deliberate obfuscation 
aimed at hiding the full implications of the arguments made about the ethics of 
gene editing and their underlying philosophical justifications.”
Lastly, in “A Defense of Limited Regulation of Human Genetic Engineering,” 
James Hughes develops his argumentation on the basis of the position that human 
genetic engineering needs to be regulated in the context of the “unfinished project 
of liberal democracy.” He argues that there is no a priori reason why gene thera-
pies should have higher standards of safety than other therapies. Much of Hughes’ 
focus is on the United States. The struggle for a liberal regulatory environment for 
gene therapies is an extension of the struggle in that country for a “more liberal, 
noncommunitarian democracy, one that maximally respects cognitive, bodily, and 
reproductive freedom.” Primarily as a consequence of various political factors, 
the United States still has rather liberal regulations around gene therapy. Hence, 
argues Hughes, United States gene therapy regulation might serve as a model for 
other countries—with the exception of the Congressional ban on heritable gene 
therapy.
As demonstrated by this collection of papers, when bioethicists pick up the 
challenge to clarify values and develop arguments for an area of inquiry as com-
plex and consequential as gene editing, they succeed in moving the discussion 
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